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Abstract
The concept and technics of real space renormalization group are
applied to study majority rule voting in hierarchical structures. It is
found that democratic voting can lead to totalitarianism by keeping
in power a small minority. Conditions of this paradox are analyzed
and singled out. Indeed majority rule produces critical thresholds to
absolute power. Values of these thresholds can vary from 50% up to at
least 77%. The associated underlying mechanism could provide an ex-
planation for both former apparent eternity of communist leaderships
as well as their sudden collapse.
∗Laboratoire associe´ au CNRS (UMR n◦ 7603)
1
1 Setting the limits
Modern theory of critical phenomena is based on the fundamental concepts
of universality and irrelevant variables [1]. These two concepts mean that
different physical systems, like for instance a magnet and a liquid, behave
the same way when passing from one macroscopic state to another macro-
scopic state. Well known examples are the magnet becoming a para-magnet,
the liquid, a gas, and even may be the creation of the universe from noth-
ing with the big bang. Most of the microscopic properties of the physical
compounds involved turn out to be irrelevant for describing the macroscopic
change which in turn appears to be universal. While the number of physical
systems undergoing phase transitions is infinite, all associated phase transi-
tions can be described in terms of only a small finite number of universality
classes. Only a few parameters, like space dimensionality, determine which
universality class the system belongs to. The abstract and general nature
of the statistical physics framework makes it tempting to extend such no-
tions to non-physical systems, and in particular to social systems, for which,
in many cases, there exists an interplay between microscopic properties and
macroscopic realities.
Nevertheless the two fields of physical sciences and social sciences are
rather different. However, the process of going in parallel from one atom and
one human to respectively several atoms in bulk and a social group has much
in common. More precisely, it is the hypothesis behind the present approach.
It is worth stressing that we are not claiming our models will explain all
aspects of human behavior. Like any modeling effort, it is appropriate only
to some classes of phenomena in social science and not to others.
However such an approach should be carefully controlled. To just map a
physical theory built for a physical reality, onto a social reality, could be at
best a nice metaphore, but without predictability, and at worst a misleading
and wrong social theory. Physics has been successfull in describing macro-
scopic behavior using properties of the constituant microscopic elements.
The task here, is to borrow from physics those techniques and concepts used
to tackle the complexity of aggregations. The challenge is then to build a
collective theory of social behavior along similar lines, but within the spe-
cific constraints of the psycho-social reality. The constant danger is for the
theorist to stay in physics, using a social terminology and a physical formal-
ism. The contribution from physics should thus be restricted to qualitative
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guidelines for the mathematical modeling of complex social realities. Such a
limitation does not make the program less ambitious.
2 Real space: from physics to politics
In this paper we present an application of statistical physics to political sci-
ences [2]. We apply the concept and technics of real space renormalization
group [1] to study the majority rule voting process within hierarchical struc-
tures. In particular we focus on the conditions for a given political party to
get for sure, full power at the hierarchy top level.
We find that majority rule voting produces critical threshold to total
power. Having an initial support above the critical threshold guarantees full
power at the top. The value of the critical threshold to power is a function
of the voting structure, namely the size of voting groups and the number of
voting hierarchical levels. Using these results a new explanation is given to
the sudden and abrupt fall of eastern former communist parties.
Here we apply the real space renormalization group scheme of collective
phenomena in physics to a radically different reality, namely a social one We
emphasis on other technical aspects than the ones usually used in physics.
While there it is an abstract and formal tool to study phase transitions,
here we associate a political reality to each step of the renormalization group
transformation. On this basis it is worth to stress we apply statistical physics
to political sciences not as a qualitative metaphor but indeed as a guide to
build a quantitative model to study the effect of majority rule voting on hte
democratic representation of groups within a hierarchical organization.
Like in physics we start from local cells constituted by a small number
of degrees of freedom, here individuals. Similarly to Ising spins, to keep the
analysis simple, people can choose only between two political tendencies A
and B. Associated proportions of A and B support in the system, a political
group, a firm, a network, a society, are supposed to be known. We denote
them by p0 for the overall A-support and 1 − p0 for the B-support. We are
assuming each member does have an opinion.
Once formed, each cell elects a representative, either an A or a B using a
majority rule. These elected people (the equivalent of the super spin rescaled
to an Ising one in real space renormalization group) constitute the first hier-
archical level of the organization called level-1. New cells are then formed at
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level-1 from these elected people. They in turn elect new representatives to
build level-2. This process is repeated again and again.
In physics the rescaled degree of freedom is fictius while here it is a real
person. We are not using a theoretical scheme to embody some complex
features but instead we are building up a real organization where each voting
step is real. Moreover at odd with physics the number of iterations in the
renormalization process are finite and the focus is on the stable fixed points.
The following of the paper is as follows. In next section we present and
study the case of 3-person cells. A critical threshold to power is singled out.
It equals 50%. A minority is found to self-eliminate within a few voting levels.
A making sense bias in the voting rule is then introduced in Section 3. A one
vote bonus is added to the tendency already in power in cases of A-B equality.
For 4-person cells, this bias shift the critical threshold to power from 50%
to 77%. Size effects are analyzed in Section 4. Analytic formulas are then
derived. In particular, given an initial support p0 for the A, the number of
voting levels necessary to their self-elimination is obtained. Section 5 puts
the results in a more practical perspective. Last section contains a discussion
about both former apparent eternity of communist leaderships as well as their
sudden collapse. Some.perspectives are outlined.
3 The simplest fair case
We start from a population distributed among two tendencies A and B with
respectively p0 and 1 − p0 proportions within the the system. It could be
either a political group, a firm, or a whole society. At this stage each member
does have an opinion. From now on we will use the political language.
Cells are constituted by randomly aggregating group of 3 persons. It
could be by home localization or working place. Each cell then elects a
representative using majority rule. To have an A elected requires either 3 A
or 2 A in the cell. Otherwise it is a b who is elected. these elected persons
constitute the first level of the hierarchy denoted level-1. The same process of
cell forming can be repeated within level-1 from the elected persons. Making
the cell to vote produces an additional level, namely level-2. We can go on
the same way from a level-n to a level-(n+1). The probability to have an A
elected at level (n+1) is then,
pn+1 ≡ P3(pn) = p3n + 3p2n(1− pn) , (1)
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where pn is the proportion of elected A persons at level-n.
We call P3(pn) the voting function. It has 3 fixed points pd = 0, pc,3 =
1
2
and pt = 1. First one corresponds to the disappearance of the A. Last one
pt represents the totalitarian situation where only A are present. Both are
stable. At contrast pc is unstable. It determines the threshold to full power.
Starting from p0 <
1
2
repeating voting leads towards 0 while the flow is in
direction of 1 for p0 >
1
2
.
Therefore majority rule voting produces the self-elimination of any pro-
portion of the A-tendency as long as p0 <
1
2
. However the democratic self-
elimination to be completed requires a sufficient number of voting levels.
At this stage the instrumental question is to determine the number of
levels required to ensure full leadership to the initial larger tendency. The
analysis will turn relevant to reality only if this level numbers is small. Most
organizations has only a few level, and always less than 10.
For instance starting from p0 = 0.43 we get successively p1 = 0.40, p2 =
0.35, p3 = 0.28, p4 = 0.20, p5 = 0.10, p6 = 0.03 down to p7 = 0.00. Therefore
7 levels are sufficient to self-eliminate 43% of the population.
Tough the aggregating voting process eliminate a tendency it stays demo-
cratic since it is the leading tendency (more than 50% ) which after all gets
the total leadership of the organization. It is worth to notice the symmetry
with respect to A nd B tendencies.
4 The simplest killing case
In real world things are not as fair as above and often it turns out very
hard, if not impossible, to change an organization leadership. We will now
illustrate this situation.
Considering yet the simplest case we constitute groups of 4 persons in-
stead of 3. The salient new feature is the 2A-2B configuration for which there
exists no clear majority. In most social situations it is well admitted that to
change a policy required a clear cut majority. In case of no decision, things
will stay as they are. It is a bias in favor of the already existing. Often this
bias is achieved giving for instance, one additional vote to the committee
president.
Along this line, the voting function becomes non symmetrical. Assuming
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the B were in power, for an A to be elected at level n+ 1 we have,
pn+1 ≡ P4(pn) = p4n + 4p3n(1− pn) , (2)
where pn is the proportion of elected A persons at level-n. At contrast for a
B it is,
1− P4(pn) = p4n + 4p3n(1− pn) + 2p2n(1− pn)2 , (3)
where last term embodies the bias in favor of B. From Eqs (2) and (3) the
stable fixed points are still 0 and 1. However the unstable one is drastically
shifted to,
pc,4 =
1 +
√
13
6
, (4)
which makes the threshold to power to the A about 77%. Moreover the
process of self-elimination is accelerated. For instance from p0 = 0.69 we
have the series p1 = 0.63, p2 = 0.53, p3 = 0.36, p4 = 0.14, p5 = 0.01, and
p6 = 0.00. It shows that using an a priori reasonable bias in favor of the B
turns a majority rule democratic voting to a totalitarian outcome. Indeed
to get to power the A must pass over 77% of support which almost out of
a possibility. Above series shows how 63% of a population disappears from
the leadership within only 5 voting levels.
5 Larger voting groups
Most real organizations work with voting cells larger than 3 or 4. To account
for this size variable we generalize above scheme to cells with r voting persons.
We then have to determine the voting function pn+1 = Pr(pn). Using a
majority rule it becomes,
Pr(pn) =
l=m∑
l=r
r!
l!(r − l)!p
l
n(1 + pn)
r−l , (5)
where m = r+1
2
for odd r and m = r+1
2
for even r which thus accounts for the
B-bias.
The two stable fixed points pd = 0 and pt = 1 are preserved with enlarging
the group size. However while the unstable one stays pc,r =
1
2
for odd sizes,
it varies with r for even sizes. It starts at pc,4 =
1+
√
13
6
with the limit pc,r → 12
when r →∞.
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We can then calculate analytically the critical number of levels nc at
which pnc = ǫ with ǫ being a very small number. It determines the level of
confidence of the prediction to have no A elected.. One way to evaluate nc
is to expand the voting function pn = Pr(n− 1) around the unstable fixed
point pc,r,
pn ≈ pc,r + (pn−1 − pc,r)λr , (6)
where λr ≡ dPr(pn)dpn |pc,r with Pr(pc) = pc,r. Rewriting last equation as,
pn − pc,r ≈ (pn−1 − pc,r)λr , (7)
we can then iterate the process to get,
pn − pc,r ≈ (p0 − pc,r)λnr , (8)
from which we get the critical number of levels nc at which pn = ǫ. Taking
the ln on both side of Eq. (8) gives,
n ≈ − ln(pc − p0)
lnλr
+ n0 , (9)
where n0 ≡ ln(pc,r−ǫ)lnλr is only valid not too far from pc,r. However it turns out
to be a rather good estimate even down to the sable fixed point 0 by making
it equal to 1 while taking the integer part of Eq .(9). For a more accurate
calculation of n0 see [3].
6 The magic formula
Most organizations don’t change their structure at every election or decision
event. They are set once and then don’t change any longer. The number of
hierarchical levels is thus fixed and constant. Therefore to make our analysis
useful we have to invert the question on“how many levels are needed to
eliminate a tendency” onto “given n levels what is the necessary overall
support to get full power”.
It is worth to keep in mind that situations for respectively A and B
tendencies are not always symetric. Here we stress the dynamics of voting
with respect to the A. To implement theis operative question, we invert
Eq.(7) to,
p0 = pc,r + (pn − pc,r)λ−nr . (10)
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indeed two critical thresholds now appears. First one, the disappearence
threshold pnd,r which gives the value of support under which the A disappears
for sure at the top level leadership. It is given by Eq. (10) putting pn = 0,
pnd,r = pc,r(1− λ−nr ) . (11)
In parallel putting pn = 1 give the second threshold p
n
f,r above which the A
get full and total power. Using Eq.(11), we get,
pnf,r = p
n
d,r + λ
−n
r . (12)
which shows the appearence of a new region for pnd,r < p0 < p
n
f,r. In that
region the A neither disappear totally nor get full power (pn is neither 0 nor
1). It is therefore a coexistence region where some democraty is prevailing
since results of the election process are only probabilistic. No tendency is
sure of winning making alternating leadership a reality. However as seen from
Eq.(12), this democratic region shrinks as a power law λ−nr of the number n
of hierarchical levels. Having a small number of levels thus puts higher the
threshold to a total reversal of power but simultaneously lowers the threshold
for non existence.
Again, above formulas are approximates since we have neglected correc-
tions in the vicinity of the stable fixed points. However they give the right
qualitative behavior. Actually pnd,r fits to n + 1 and p
n
f,r to n + 2. For more
accurate formulas see [3].
To get a practical feeling of what Eqs. (11) and (12) means, let us il-
lustrate them for the case r = 4 where we have λ = 1.64 and pc,4 =
1+
√
13
6
.
Considering 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 level organizations, pnd,r is equals to respectively
0.59, 0.66, 0.70, 0.73 and 0.74. In parallel pnf,r equals 0.82, 0.80, 0.79, 0.78
and 0.78. These series emphasizes drastically the totalitarian character of
the voting process.
7 Some prospective
Up to now we have treated very simple cases to single out main trends pro-
duced by democratic voting aggregating over several levels. In particular we
have singled out the existence of critical thresholds to full power. Moreover
these tresholds are not necesseraly symetric for both tendencies in competi-
tion. In the biased 4-cell case it is around 0.77% for the A.
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Such asymetries are indeed always present in most realistic situations in
which more than two groups are competing. Let us consider for instance the
case of three competing groups A, B and C. Assuming a 3-cell case, now the
ABC configuration is unsolved using majority rule as it was for the precedent
two tendencies AABB 4-cell configuration. For the AB case we made the bias
in favor of the group already in power, like giving an additional vote to the
comitee president.
For multi-group competitions typically the bias results from parties agree-
ment. Usually the two largest parties, say A and B are hostile while the
smallest one C would compromise with either one of them. Then the ABC
configuration gives a C elected. In such a case, we need 2A or 2B to elect
respectively an A or a B. Otherwise a C is elected. Therefore the elective
function for A and B are the same as for the AB 3-cell model. It means that
the critical threshold to full power to A and B is 50%. In otherwords for
initial A and B supports less than 50% the C get full power. The required
number of levels is obtained from above formulas.
It is possible to generalize to as many groups as wanted. The analysis
becomes more heavy but the mean features of voting flows towards fixed
point are preserved.
8 Conclusion
To conclude we comment on some possible new explanation to the recent
generalized auto-collapse of eastern communist parties. Up to this historical
and drastic event, communist parties seemed eternal with the same leader-
ship ever. Once they collapsed most explanations were related to both an
opportunistic change within the various organizations together with the end
of the soviet army threat.
May be the explanation is different and related to our hierachical model.
Indeed communist organizations are based on the structutral concept of
democratic centralism which nothing else than a tree-like hierachy with a
rather high critical threshold to power. Suppose it was of order of 80% like
in our 4-cell case. We could than consider that the internal opposition to
the orthodox leadership did grew a lot and massively over several decades to
evantually reach and pass the critical threshold with the associated sudden
outrise of the internal opposition. Therefore the at once collapse of eatern
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communist pparties would have been the result of a very long and solid phe-
nomena. Such an explanation does not oppose to additional constraints but
emphazie on the internal mechanism within these organizations.
At this stage it is of importance to stress that modeling social and political
phenomena is not stating some absolute truth but insted to single out some
basic trend within very complexe situations.
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